Does Managerial Myopia Restrain the Innovation Incentive Effect of Talent Policy?

Abstract

Abstract: Innovation-driven is essentially talent-driven. How to improve the incentive system and create a good environment to fully stimulate the innovation vitality of talents is an important practical topic for the in-depth implementation of talents strategy for powerful nation in the new era. In the practice of China's innovation-driven development, the government has successively introduced a package of incentives for technological innovation with financial and tax support as the core. Among these, there is still a lack of sufficient empirical evidence on the effectiveness of talent policy as a dedicated government investment in human capital, directly targeting the most scarce factor of talent production for firm innovation, to stimulate quality innovation in firms. At the same time, the upper echelon theories and time-oriented theories point out that enterprise managers subjectively pay more attention to the short term and prefer the present, and generally produce managerial myopia, distort and worsen the internal innovation environment of enterprises, which in turn may inhibit the effective functioning of government incentives. However, at present, there is a lack of direct empirical evidence from academia on whether managerial myopia negatively moderates the innovation incentive effect of government incentive policies, especially talent policies, which provides room for a marginal contribution to this paper, which will help explore feasible paths and powerful grips for strengthening talent incentives and optimizing the talent environment from the micro level of enterprises. Based on signal theory, upper echelon and time-oriented theory, this paper takes China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as a sample. Talent subsidies are separated from the disclosed government subsidy details and machine learning techniques are used to construct managerial short-termism indicators to empirically test the innovation incentive effect of talent policies and the moderating effect of managerial short-termism on the innovation incentive effect of talent policies. The results show that the talent policy has a strong innovation incentive effect and can effectively promote high-quality innovation of enterprises. However, at the same time, the more short-sighted the manager, the more prominent the inhibitory effect on the innovation incentive effect of talent policy, which means that the enterprise managerial myopia significantly inhibits the innovation incentive effect of talent policy. The above conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests, which establishes a theoretical link between macro industrial policy and micro enterprise characteristics, and provides enterprise-level evidence for the optimization and improvement of talent policy; Further heterogeneity analysis from the two dimensions of equity structure and management governance shows that increasing the shareholding ratio and equity balance of supervisory institutional investors, hiring senior executives with financial background and increasing the shareholding ratio of management can effectively alleviate the inhibitory effect of managerial myopia on the innovation incentive effect of talent policy, and provide a path reference for establishing effective self-discipline and external supervision mechanisms from the enterprise level to create a good innovation atmosphere. This paper enriches the research on the relationship between talent policy, managerial myopia and high-quality innovation of enterprises, and has certain practical implications for improving the incentive system and creating a good environment to fully stimulate the vitality of talent innovation, such as continuously increasing talent support, effectively creating a good enterprise innovation environment, and optimizing and improving the level of corporate governance. However, there are still certain shortcomings and limitations in this paper, such as the lack of detailed observation and accurate portrayal of the perception and response of innovative talents to managerial myopia in enterprises, and field research and interviews with innovative talents can be strengthened in the future to enrich the study of the interaction between innovative talents and managers in enterprises. At the same time, in the future, we may try to discuss the support and influence of employee support and organizational atmosphere on innovative talents from a bottom-up perspective, so as to improve and optimize the corporate innovation environment to fully stimulate talents.

Key words: talent policy, managerial myopia, enterprise innovation, incentive effect

CLC Number:

F272

ZHU Hao, LI Lin, ZHANG Lulu, HE Jianhong. Does Managerial Myopia Restrain the Innovation Incentive Effect of Talent Policy?[J]. Science of Science and Management of S. & T., 2024, 45(04): 173-194.

References

安同良,千慧雄. 2021. 中国企业R&D补贴策略:补贴阈限、最优规模与模式选择[J]. 经济研究,56(1):122-137. (An T, Qian H X. 2021. Chinese R&D subsidy strategy: Threshold, optimal scale and mode choice[J]. Economic Research Journal,56(1):122-137.) 陈爱贞,陈凤兰,何诚颖. 2021. 产业链关联与企业创新[J]. 中国工业经济,(9):80-98. (Chen A Z, Chen F L, 2021. He C Y. Industry chain linkage and frim's innovation[J]. China Industrial Economics,(9):80-98.) 陈强远,林思彤,张醒. 2020. 中国技术创新激励政策：激励了数量还是质量[J]. 中国工业经济,(4):79-96. (Chen Q Y, Lin S T, Zhang X. 2020. The effect of China's incentive policies for technological innovation: Incentivizing quantity or quality[J]. China Industrial Economics,(4):79-96.) 陈修德,栗辉杨,马文聪,等. 2021. 董事会失败容忍会影响企业创新吗?[J]. 管理评论,33(8):90-103. (Chen X D, Li H Y, Ma W C, et al. 2021. Does failure tolerance of the board of directors effect corporate innovation?[J]. Management Review,33(8):90-103.) 邓建平,陈爱华. 2017. 高管金融背景与企业现金持有:基于产业政策视角的实证研究[J]. 经济与管理研究,(3):133-144. (Deng J P, Chen A H. 2017. Executive financial background and cash holding: From the perspective of industrial policy[J]. Research on Economics and Management,(3):133-144.) 杜勇,谢瑾,陈建英. 2019. CEO金融背景与实体企业金融化[J]. 中国工业经济,(5):136-154. (Du Y, Xie J, Chen J Y. 2019. CEO's financial background and the financialization of entity enterprises[J]. China Industrial Economics,(5):136-154.)

高洪利,李莉,吕晨. 2022. 管理层投资视野、技术熟悉度与企业创新决策[J]. 南开管理评论,25(4):79-90. (Gao H L, Li L, Lv C. 2022. Managerial horizon, technology familiarity and corporate innovation[J]. Nankai Business Review,25(4):79-90.) 古志辉,马百超. 2020. 创新失败如何影响企业的新增研发投入?[J]. 管理评论,32(9):79-96. (Gu Z H, Ma B C. 2020. How does innovation failure affect the R&D expenditure?[J]. Management Review,32(9):79-96.) 郭玥. 2018. 政府创新补助的信号传递机制与企业创新[J]. 中国工业经济,(9):98-116. (Guo Y. 2018. Signal transmission mechanism of government innovation subsidy and enterprise innovation[J]. China Industrial Economics,(9):98-116.) 黄先海,宋学印. 2017. 准前沿经济体的技术进步路径及动力转换:从“追赶导向”到“竞争导向”[J]. 中国社会科学,(6):60-79. (Huang X H, Song X Y. 2017. The path of technological progress in quasi frontier economies and the switch to other drivers: From "catch up oriented" to "competition oriented"[J]. Social Sciences in China,(6):60-79.) 何瑛,于文蕾,戴逸驰,等. 2019. 高管职业经历与企业创新[J]. 管理世界,35(11):174-192. (He Y, Yu E L, Dai Y C, et al. 2019. Executive professional experience and enterprise innovation[J]. Journal of Management World,35(11):174-192.) 胡楠,薛付婧,王昊楠. 2021. 管理者短视主义影响企业长期投资吗？基于文本分析和机器学习[J]. 管理世界,37(5):139-156+11+ 19-21. (Hu N, Xue F J, Wang H N. 2021. Does managerial myopia affect long-term investment? Based on text analysis and machine learning[J]. Journal of Management World,37(5):139-156+11+19-21.) 蒋洁,汤超颖,张启航,等. 2021. 产业特征对技术创新激励政策效应的交互影响[J]. 科研管理,42(11):71-81. (Jiang J, Tang C Y, Zhang Q H, et al. 2021. Interactive influence of industrial characteristics on the effect of technological innovation incentive policies[J]. Science Research Management,42(11):71-81.) 李琳,刘凤委,卢文彬. 2009. 基于公司业绩波动性的股权制衡治理效应研究[J]. 管理世界,25(5):145-151. (Li L, Liu F W, Lu W B. 2009. Research on the governance effect of equity checks and balances based on the volatility of corporate performance[J]. Journal of Management World,25(5):145-151.) 黎文靖,郑曼妮. 2016. 实质性创新还是策略性创新?宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J]. 经济研究,51(4):60-73. (Li W J, Zhen M N. 2016. Is it substantive innovation or strategic innovation? Impact of macroeconomic policies on micro-enterprises' innovation[J]. Economic Research Journal,51(4):60-73.) 刘春林,田玲. 2021. 人才政策“背书”能否促进企业创新[J]. 中国工业经济,(3):156-173. (Liu C L, Tian L. 2021. Can talent policy endorsement promote firm innovation[J]. China Industrial Economics,(3):156-173.) 刘霄,孙俊华. 2023. 科研人员工作满意度及其影响因素的国际比较[J]. 科学学研究,41(5):874-885. (Liu X, Sun J H. 2023. International comparative study on job satisfaction and its influencing factors of scientific researchers[J]. Studies in Science of Science,41(5):874-885.) 刘云,杨芳娟. 2017. 我国高端科技人才计划资助科研产出特征分析[J]. 科研管理,38(S1):610-622. (Liu Y, Yang F J. 2017. An analysis of funding characteristics of China's high-level S&T talent program[J]. Science Research Management,38(S1):610-622.) 龙小宁,林志帆. 2018. 中国制造业企业的研发创新:基本事实、常见误区与合适计量方法讨论[J]. 中国经济问题,(2):114-135. (Long X N, Lin Z F. 2018. R&D and innovations of Chinese manufacturing firms: Basic facts, common misunderstandings, and discussions on the appropriate choice of econometric methods[J]. China Economic Studies,(2):114-135.) 权小锋,醋卫华,尹洪英. 2019. 高管从军经历、管理风格与公司创新[J]. 南开管理评论,22(6):140-151. (Quan X F, Cu W H, Yin H Y. 2019. Military service experiences of top management, management style and corporate innovation[J]. Nankai Business Review,22(6):140-151.) 邵剑兵,吴珊. 2020. 高新技术企业股权激励与双元创新[J]. 研究与发展管理,32(4):176-186. (Shao J B, Wu S. 2020. Stock incentives and ambidextrous innovation of high-tech enterprises[J]. R&D Management,32(4): 176-186.)

申宇,黄昊,赵玲. 2018. 地方政府“创新崇拜”与企业专利泡沫[J]. 科研管理,39(4):83-91. (Shen Y, Huang H, Zhao L. 2018. Local government R&D worship and enterprise patent bubbles[J]. Science Research Management,39(4):83-91.) 孙鲲鹏,罗婷,肖星. 2021. 人才政策、研发人员招聘与企业创新[J]. 经济研究,56(8):143-159. (Sun K P, Luo T, Xiao X. 2021. Talent policy, R&D recruitment and corporate innovation[J]. Economic Research Journal,56 (8):143-159.) 田轩,孟清扬. 2018. 股权激励计划能促进企业创新吗[J]. 南开管理评论,21(3):176-190. (Tian X, Meng Q Y. 2018. Do stock incentive schemes spur corporate innovation[J]. Nankai Business Review,21(3):176-190.) 王刚刚,谢富纪,贾友. 2017. R&D补贴政策激励机制的重新审视:基于外部融资激励机制的考察[J]. 中国工业经济,(2):60-78. (Wang G G, Xie F J, Jia Y. 2017. Reconsider incentive mechanism of R&D subsidy policy:Based on exploration for external financing incentive mechanism[J]. China Industrial Economics,(2):60-78.) 吴伟伟,张天一. 2021. 非研发补贴与研发补贴对新创企业创新产出的非对称影响研究[J]. 管理世界,37(3):137-160+10. (Wu W W, Zhang T Y. 2021. The asymmetric influence of non-R&D subsidies and R&D subsidies on innovation output of new ventures[J]. Journal of Management World,37(3):137-160+10.) 闫昊,赵兰香,周建中. 2023. 导师身份与杰出科技人才成长：一项事件史研究[J]. 科学学研究,41(7):1247-1258. (Yan H, Zhao L X, Zhou J Z. 2023. Tutor status and the career growth of outstanding scientific and technological talents: Anevent history research[J]. Studies in Science of Science,41(7):1247-1258.) 杨国超,芮萌. 2020. 高新技术企业税收减免政策的激励效应与迎合效应[J]. 经济研究,55(9):174-191. (Yang G C, Rui M. 2020. The incentive effect and catering effect of tax-reducing policy for high-tech enterprises[J]. Economic Research Journal,55(9):174-191.) 杨海燕,韦德洪,孙健. 2012. 机构投资者持股能提高上市公司会计信息质量吗?兼论不同类型机构投资者的差异[J]. 会计研究, (9):16-23+96. (Yang H Y, Wei D H, Sun J. 2012. The institutional ownership can improve the accounting information quality? The difference of institutional investors types[J]. Accounting Research,(9):16-23+96.) 杨瑞龙,侯方宇. 2019. 产业政策的有效性边界:基于不完全契约的视角[J]. 管理世界,35(10):82-94+219-220. (Yang R L, Hou F Y. 2019. The efficient boundary of industrial policy: An incomplete contract perspective[J]. Journal of Management World,35(10):82-94+219-220.) 杨洋,魏江,罗来军. 2015. 谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J]. 管理世界,31(1):75-86+98+188. (Yang Y, Wei J, Luo L M. 2015. Who innovate from the government subsidies? The joint moderate effects of the ownership and the factor market distortions[J]. Journal of Management World,31(1):75-86+98+188.) 俞鸿琳. 2022. 实体企业金融化:管理者短视角度的新解释[J]. 经济管理,44(3):55-71. (Yu H L. 2022. Enterprises financialization: The reasons from the view of manager's myopia[J]. Business and Management Journal,44(3):55-71.) 余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波. 2010. 政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J]. 经济研究,45(3):65-77. (Yu M G, Hui Y F. 2010. Political connections, rent seeking and the fiscal subsidy efficiency of local governments[J]. Economic Research Journal,45(3):65-77.) 张彩江,陈璐. 2016. 政府对企业创新的补助是越多越好吗?[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理,37(11):11-19. (Zhang C J, Chen L. 2016. More government subsidies, more innovation?[J]. Science of Science and Management of S.&T., 37(11):11-19.) 张杰. 2021. 中国政府创新政策的混合激励效应研究[J]. 经济研究,56(8):160-173. (Zhang J. 2021. Mixed incentive effect of Chinese government innovation polices[J]. Economic Research Journal,56(8): 160-173.) 张宛姝,陈睿,刘柯,等. 2018. 科学基金资助人才成长特征分析:以创新研究群体项目负责人为例[J]. 中国科学基金,32(4):382-386. (Zhang W S, Chen R, Li K, et al. 2018. Analysis of talent growth characteristics funded by NSFC: Taking the leader ofsciencefund for creative research groups as an example[J]. Bulletin of National Natural Science Foundation of China,32(4): 382-386.) 张晓亮,杨海龙,唐小飞. 2019. CEO学术经历与企业创新[J]. 科研管理,40(2):154-163. (Zhang X L, Yang H L, Tang X F. 2019. CEO's academic experience and firm innovation[J]. Science Research Management, 40(2):154-163.) 张岩,吴芳. 2022.“抢人”政策对高新技术企业市场价值的影响[J]. 科研管理,43(3):72-78. (Zhang Y, Wu F. 2022. The effect of S&T talent-attracting policies on the market value of high-techenterprises[J]. Science Research Management,43(3):72-78.) 朱涛,李君山,朱林染. 2022. 管理者特征、R&D投入与企业绩效[J]. 科研管理,43(3):201-208. (Zhu T, Li J S, Zhu L R. 2022. Manager characteristics, R&D input and enterprise performance[J]. Science Research Management,43(3):201-208.) Ahmadjian V. 1986. Symbiosis: An Introduction to Biological Association[M]. England: University of Press of New England. Antia M J, Pantzalis C, Park J C. 2010. CEO Decision horizon and firm performance: An empirical investigation[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,16:288-301. Arrow K. 1962. The economic implication of learning by doing[J]. Review of Economic Studies,29(2):155-173. Barker V L, Mueller G C. 2002. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending[J]. Management Science,48(6):782-801. Chen J, Heng C S, Tan B C, et al. 2018. The distinct signaling effects of R&D subsidy and non-R&D subsidy on IPO performance of IT entrepreneurial firms in China[J]. Research Policy,47(1):108-120. Ciamarra E S. 2012. Monitoring by affiliated bankers on board of directors: Evidence from corporate financing outcomes[J]. Financial Management,41(3):665-702. Hambrick D C, Mason P A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers[J]. Academy of Management Review,9(2):193-206. Hassan T A, Hollander S, Van L L, et al. 2019. Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,134(4):2135-2202. Laverty K J. 1996. Economic short-termism: The debate, the unresolved issues, and the implications for management practice and research[J]. Academy of Management Review,21(3):825-860. Lin Y L, Shi W, Perscott J E, et al. 2019. In the eye of beholder: Top managers' long-term orientation, industry context, and decision-making process[J]. Journal of Management,45(2):3114-3145. Lumpkin G T, Brigham K H. 2011. Long-term orientation and intertemporal choice in family firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,35(6):1149-1169. Martin G, Wiseman R, Gomez-Mejia L. 2016. Going short-term or long-term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack[J]. Strategic Management Journal,37(12):2463-2480. Stein J C. 1989. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,104(4):655-669.

[1]	QIN Yinglin , LIN Zhong , TIAN Yunqing. A Study on the Cross Level Impact of High Performance Work System on Internal Entrepreneurial Behavior of Employees [J]. Science of Science and Management of S. & T., 2024, 45(05): 184-198.
[2]	LING Hongcheng, YANG Zhen, XU Ruiqian, CHEN Jin. Green Effect of Public Experience: CEO Public Environmental Protection Experience Diversity and Enterprise Green Technology Innovation#br# [J]. Science of Science and Management of S. & T., 2024, 45(03): 189-210.
[3]	MA Rongkang, ZHAO Miaolei. Research on the Evolution Characteristics of Enterprise Ecosystem Based on Employee Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Alibaba#br# [J]. Science of Science and Management of S. & T., 2024, 45(03): 168-188.
[4]	ZHOU Shunyi, SU Zhongxing, YAN Jiaqi, QIAN Yu. The Influence of Reciprocal Vicarious Learning on Value Co-creation in Flexible Organizations [J]. Science of Science and Management of S. & T., 2021, 42(11): 158-177.
[5]	. [J]. , 2013, 34(06): 152-162.